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I
n the digital age, grantmakers should be able to assess 
and, when appropriate, help address the digital security 
threats faced by grantees and grant applicants. Yet, 
because this is new terrain for most grantmakers, they 
are likely to experience a range of challenges. These 
challenges include:
• Not knowing where to start;
• Not understanding the language of information security;
• Feeling overwhelmed;
• Not knowing where to turn for advice;
• Being unsure of what to do in the face of digital 
security concerns;
• Clarifying and responding to interlocking acute and 
long term problems of digital and physical security;
• Convincing grantees to make changes in information 
technology where historically they have often been left 
to make their own decisions.
Good news: you can address, or at least mitigate, these 
challenges. The purpose of this guide is to help grant-
makers both assess and address digital security concerns. 
The guide is divided into three sections.
• Section 1 explores the scope of targeted digital 
threats against civil society and the constraints that 
hamper the ability to address them.
• Section 2 describes how to conduct a digital security 
“triage” of grants to elevate the digital security of your 
whole grant portfolio; while playing special attention to 
the highest risk grantees.
• Section 3 is the conclusion and provides suggestions 
for pathways to think more systematically about digital 
security as a part of grantcraft.
Digital security breaches can cause harm to grantees, as 
well as their clients, beneficiaries, and partner organizations. 
These threats also pose a risk to grantmakers and to the 
larger strategies of impacted organizations. Security leaks 
can compromise an organization’s ability to carry out its 
work, and can erode trust between civil society actors. 
Though it can be difficult to get started, funders have an 
important role to play in starting conversations with grantees 
on digital security threats and ways to mitigate them.
Are you currently considering a proposal 
for digital security tools or training? If so, 
this is not the document for you. Evaluating a proposal 
that supports the development of digital security tools 
requires substantial technical expertise. It is therefore 
best practice to get an expert assessment from an 
information security professional. Seeking the advice of 
your organization’s chief technology officer or someone in 
a similar position is often a good place to start. More 
information about digital security trainings is available in 
section three of this guide.
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SECTION 1
SCOPE OF THE DIGITAL SECURITY PROBLEM
DIGITAL SECURITY THREATS TO CIVIL SOCIETY
A growing number of civil society organizations face many 
of the same targeted information security threats experi-
enced by governments and the private sector. Some of the 
same threat actors that make front page news by stealing 
corporate secrets and infiltrating government computers 
are also regularly targeting civil society. At the same time, 
the cost of conducting digital monitoring is dropping and 
the technologies are being acquired by more government 
and non-state actors. This leaves open the possibility for 
these technologies to be further abused and turned against 
NGOs. Even organizations engaged in work viewed as 
non-threatening to governments and non-state actors face 
a more dangerous digital environment due to the rise in 
cyber-based crime. Despite these developments, digital 
security risks are not fully understood by many in civil 
society and organizations often lack the resources to 
effectively respond.
UNDERSTANDING TYPES OF DIGITAL SECURITY 
THREATS
We think of digital security threats in two ways —passive 
monitoring, such as a government tracking a person or an 
organization’s metadata1 and remote intrusion, such as 
the targeted malware attacks discussed above or phishing 
for purposes of stealing information. This framing is useful 
for grantmakers when considering when and how to 
potentially help grantees. While it can be difficult to 
demonstrate conclusively that the communications of civil 
society organizations have been specifically intercepted via 
passive monitoring (with exceptions), cases of remote 
intrusion (aka “hacking”) have been well-documented. 
Once an organization has reached a baseline level of digital 
security against remote intrusion and credential theft, it will 
be better prepared to address more sophisticated patterns 
1 Metadata is information that helps to describe other kinds of data. For 
example, a text book is full of metadata — the table of contents, index, 
copyright page, and citations can all be thought of as metadata. In the 
digital environment, examples of metadata include a person or 
organization’s call logs and web browsing history.
2 A “zero day” vulnerability is typically used to refer to a flaw in software 
that is not yet known to the vendor, and that could be leveraged by 
attackers to gain control of a system, or for other malicious purposes.
REAL CASE STUDIES IN TARGETED 
DIGITAL ATTACKS AGAINST CIVIL 
SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS
Example 1: The director of a NGO working on freedom of 
expression issues in an Asian country is reading emails when 
she spots a message from a funder. The sender appeared to 
be their program officer, and the email provides an update on 
an upcoming meeting with a request for feedback on an 
agenda that was attached to the email.
Example 2: In South America, an environmental activist 
receives an e-mail from the director of a journalism organiza-
tion, with distressing news that her personal information has 
been exposed on a website. Would she like to check the link?
Example 3: In the Emirates, a human rights defender 
receives a text message alert with a news story relevant to his 
work. Meanwhile, in Mexico a journalist receives a string of 
text messages that look like news alerts, mobile bill alerts, and 
Facebook messages.
All three of these attacks were designed to trick the recipients 
into clicking links or opening files with malicious programs. In 
Example 1, the malware was hidden in a legitimate-looking 
document. In Example 2, the activist was shown a fake Flash 
Player update message. And in Example 3, visiting the link 
would have silently infected the targets’ iPhones, using an 
expensive “zero day” vulnerability.2 In each case, once the 
malware was on a device, it could silently spy on the victim, 
siphoning off personal data, activating camera and microphone, 
and tracking their every word.
Fortunately, the NGO worker in Asia sensed something was 
amiss and did not open the file. This prevented extremely 
sensitive information she had from reaching the hands of a 
government seeking to exploit it. Unfortunately, her program 
officer had been hacked by the government. In the second 
case the environmental activist’s computer was compromised, 
exposing her personal information to hackers with interests 
closely aligned with a powerful government in the region. In 
Example 3, both targets sensed something was amiss, and did 
not click. In each case, the intended victims shared the 
suspicious materials with researchers, leading to the 
unmasking of major campaigns.
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of threats across the board. Note that this guide does not 
prioritize issues like the defacement of websites, and online 
content, although this will likely be a topic of concern for 
some organizations.
Remote intrusion, or targeted attacks, can take a number of 
forms. For example, civil society organizations working on 
issues related to China are known to be targeted by 
sophisticated government-linked hacking groups that use 
advanced intrusion tools. Historically, many of these 
attacks have begun when victims are tricked into opening a 
document or link containing malicious code. Once the code 
has run on the victim’s machine, the attackers use this 
point of entry to collect sensitive information. In other 
cases, attackers may directly target the computers and 
servers of organizations looking for weaknesses, such as a 
lack of software updates, and compromise the device 
without interacting with victims. Evidence suggests that 
governments in several Middle Eastern, African, and Latin 
American countries outsource their targeted digital attacks 
to non-state actors.
Meanwhile, many more countries are known to be 
customers of companies that sell commercial hacking 
tools. For example, there are over 70 known government 
clients of the Italian-based Hacking Team, while another 32 
countries are known to have purchased FinFisher, which 
was developed by a German and UK-based company. 
Most recently, malware and zero-day exploits sold by NSO 
Group, an Israel-based company, were found being used in 
digital snooping against human rights defenders and 
journalists. While the tools are designed to be difficult to 
track, investigations undertaken by the Citizen Lab at the 
University of Toronto in countries ranging from Morocco, 
Mexico, the UAE, Ethiopia, Ecuador and Bahrain, have 
found evidence that governments have been using these 
tools against civil society groups.
Sophisticated phishing attacks, where victims are tricked 
into providing passwords or two-factor codes, have also 
been widely observed targeting civil society groups.  
These attacks can be highly personalized, and may involve 
messages masquerading as friends or colleagues of the 
target.
In addition to direct attacks, civil society organizations can 
become digitally compromised through interactions with 
third parties as well. For example, malware infected files 
can be exchanged between partner organizations, 
including between a grantee and a funder. As with CSOs, 
there is a growing body of evidence of successful targeted 
digital attacks against grantmaking organizations — and 
some of the attackers are the same as those targeting 
grantees.
CIVIL SOCIETY’S DIGITAL SECURITY LIMITATIONS
Despite the growing threats against a range of civil society 
organizations, many face chronic capacity limits with 
information technology. These limits are not specific to 
digital security, but often reflect basic priority-setting by 
organizations with finite budgets and competing financial 
pressures. For example:
• Many organizations do not have a dedicated IT staff 
person to manage their computers, network and 
website.
• Often those who do have such a person have not hired 
someone with experience or competency specifically 
in information security.
• Many organizations also lack basic digital security 
policies to protect people and data, as well as updated 
and standardized devices, networked equipment and 
software.
These capacity limits can translate into security vulnerabili-
ties. Cumulatively, this weakens an organization’s overall 
security plan. These are key areas where grantmakers can 
help drive positive change by opening a conversation with 
grantees about their overall technology capacity.
PASSIVE MONITORING VS.  
REMOTE INTRUSION
Passive Monitoring (aka “interception”): 
Can be analogized to a telephone tap placed on the 
Internet. This kind of monitoring is exceptionally difficult 
to detect, but has been historically practiced by developed 
nations. Increasingly, many less-developed nations are 
purchasing ‘turnkey’ products that provide them with 
these capabilities. Passive monitoring can target both the 
contents of communications, such as what is said, as well 
as metadata generated by communications, like the 
parties in a communication.
Remote Intrusion (targeted attacks): What 
people traditionally think of as “hacking,” including the 
use of tools like malware and network intrusion to monitor 
activities on systems that an attacker does not control 
such as computers, mobile phones, tablets, and servers.
DIGITAL SECURIT Y & GR ANTCR AF T GUIDE: AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE FOR FUNDERS 4
Within civil society, an ecosystem of service providers, 
non-profit security trainers, advisors and technical tools 
has emerged as different groups work to enhance the 
digital security of civil society organizations. It may be 
tempting for funders to look for template solutions from this 
ecosystem. However, successful development and deploy-
ment of solutions to information security challenges often 
vary from organization to organization. It is therefore 
important that all funders increase their knowledge about 
information security and how to apply that knowledge in 
the context of specific grants. Now that you have a better 
sense of the digital security threats and resource chal-
lenges that civil society organizations face, the remainder 
of the guide will focus on the steps program officers and 
grants managers can take to help improve the landscape.
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SECTION 2
TRIAGE AND ACT – ADVANCING MORE SECURE 
GRANTMAKING
T
 his section introduces digital security triage into 
the workflow of a grantmaker, and it starts with a 
review of your existing grant portfolios. By 
implementing a systematic approach for assessing 
digital security, funders can encourage grantseekers and 
grantees to improve their digital security posture.
 PERFORM A TRIAGE OR INITIAL 
ASSESSMENT
All civil society organizations face some degree 
of digital risk, so we recommend starting by 
dividing your grant portfolio and grants under consideration 
as “some risk” or “high risk.” By undertaking a working 
digital security triage or initial assessment, you will be 
better positioned to focus your efforts on the most at risk 
organizations first.
These two categories are not intended to replace a 
systematic analysis of organizations’ risks and threats, but 
to help make the problem initially more tractable for the 
grantmaker. These questions only address certain elements 
of risk. They are intended to be answered by you, the 
grantmaker, but we strongly encourage you to seek expert 
input wherever possible throughout the process. What 
follows are a series of questions aimed at addressing some 
likely areas of concern.
Is the GRANTEE high risk?
• Does the grantee believe they are at risk? Are key 
people working for the organization controversial, or 
viewed with hostility, by to the government or 
non-state actors?
• Is the grantee or its work considered controversial by 
government or non-state actors?
• Is the grantee a likely target for monitoring or digital 
attacks? Have they been targeted before?
• Does the grantee handle sensitive information of 
interest to a government or non-state actor or the 
information of threatened groups?
• Does the grantee act as a hub for collecting and/or 
disseminating information that could be viewed as 
controversial by a government or non-state actor?
Is the CONTEXT high risk?
• Are there known cases of digital targeting against civil 
society in this context, evidence of hacking, leaks of 
internal information from civil society organizations or 
cases of device seizures etc.?
• Is civil society in general and/or this grantee’s work or 
field facing strong opposition and/or scrutiny from 
government or non-state actors?
• Is your foundation likely under scrutiny in the country 
or region where the grantee operates?
• Does the grantee work in a country in which digital 
surveillance by government or non-state actors is 
routine?
Is the PROJECT high risk?
• Will the project collect sensitive information, like 
names, addresses, phone numbers, banking informa-
tion, gender identity, or other personally identifiable 
information?
• Does the project involve creating new technical 
infrastructure (e.g. a new database, website, etc.)?
STEP  
1
DIGITAL SECURITY MINDSET:  
MAKE HACKERS WORK HARDER
It is important to keep in mind that the purpose 
of digital security work, expenditures, time, 
and thinking, is not to try to stop attacks —
but to make hackers work harder and therefore 
succeed less often. A determined attacker will try many 
strategies to access an organization’s assets. Instead of 
thinking that one solution will make an organization unhack-
able, a more reasonable approach is to think of the process as 
adding cost to accessing sensitive information. If you have 
identified a clear or potential gap in an organization’s security 
approach, this may speak to deeper organizational resource 
and capacity issues than are immediately apparent.
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• Does the project involve working with high risk groups 
or individuals (i.e. organizations or people facing 
threats of any sort from government or non-state 
actors, such as journalists covering sensitive topics, 
etc.)?
Answering “yes” to any of the questions above should 
initially put the organization in the “high risk” category. If 
you are unsure, it is probably best to assume the organiza-
tion is “high risk.” The purpose of this exercise is to lead 
you toward the organizations where you should initiate 
more in-depth discussions, identify priorities and surface 
patterns of concern across grant portfolios. Therefore, it is 
okay if you end up in a situation where most of your grants 
are initially categorized as “high risk.” That list will likely 
shrink during the next step of the process where you 
recalibrate your list.
 RECALIBRATE
After completing an initial triage, you will need 
to recalibrate the list of “high risk” organiza-
tions to determine whether or not they should 
remain “high risk” or be moved to “some risk.” We suggest 
you begin by contacting each organization that you 
identified as potentially “high risk” and discuss the 
concern(s) that placed them there. Through this, you might 
discover that your concerns are being addressed or that 
they are unwarranted. It is also an opportunity to gauge the 
organization’s interest and willingness to address the 
concern(s) you have identified, should they remain salient. 
You might also consider contacting other funders to see if 
they share concerns similar to yours. Now is also a good 
time to have a discussion with the organization about their 
general approach to digital security. To do that, we recom-
mend you start the conversation by asking the seven 
questions listed under “improving the digital security of all 
organizations” found within Step 3 below.
 REACT
With an initial triage complete and a working 
division among “high risk” and “some risk” 
grants, you are now ready to start considering 
more strategic support that aims to help improve the 
information security practices of the organizations you 
work with. Begin with high risk organizations, since the 
challenges they face can potentially have wide reaching 
and devastating effects. In the worst case scenario,  
digital attacks can compromise the physical security  
of the organization’s staff as well as the people with whom 
they work.
IMPROVING THE DIGITAL SECURITY OF HIGH RISK 
ORGANIZATIONS
We recommend grantmakers consider a three-part 
approach for addressing the needs of high-risk 
organizations:
• Find an expert in information security who can do 
a needs and threats assessment and audit. If you are 
not sure how to find an information security expert, a 
good place to start is talking to the head of your IT 
department, who may have immediate ideas and/or 
refer you to a programmatic colleague who has faced a 
similar situation.
• Support the development of information security 
policies and practices that include setting out a 
framework for investing in IT experts and equipment. 
This might also include strategies to separate how 
highly confidential information is handled, versus 
normal communications.
• Depending on your relationship with the organization, 
consider funding the resulting plan for 
addressing the organization’s digital security 
gaps, including, where necessary, upgraded 
equipment and iterative digital security training, 
as well as issues of communications security.
The approach described above focuses on the techniques 
for protection against remote intrusion, malware, phishing 
and other attacks against organizations’ digital communi-
cations and data. How you approach potentially helping a 
high risk organization will vary on a case-by-case basis, 
depending on whether an organization is seeking a grant or 
is a current grantee, and legal considerations, among other 
factors. What follows are a few potential next steps for 
grants under consideration and grants that have been 
made that are determined to be high risk.
For grants under consideration: As a first step, if you 
are not sure whether the grantee is willing to take seriously 
the digital security concerns that have surfaced, you should 
seriously consider whether to make the grant. Should you 
proceed with a grant, consider providing additional support 
that incorporates the tripartite approach outlined above. 
Consider including evaluative benchmarks for the grant that 
require the organization to demonstrate how it is fixing 
digital security gaps, be they policy and/or infrastructure 
gaps, in a sustainable way and condition future grant 
payments on such requirements.
For grants that have been made: If a grant has already 
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mental grant or, if allowed by your foundation, to spend 
administrative funds to aid grantees identified as high risk. 
In either case, we suggest using the tripartite approach 
outlined above and we encourage you to ask for help from 
someone with digital security expertise. Consider including 
evaluative benchmarks that require the organization to 
demonstrate how it is addressing digital security gaps, be 
they policy and/or infrastructure in a sustainable way.
You may find it helpful to consider digital security as part of 
a holistic package of security improvements for an organi-
zation. In some cases, high risk organizations may already 
be receiving support for physical security issues. As these 
are often the most salient, the digital security dimension 
might be overlooked or neglected.
IMPROVING THE DIGITAL SECURITY OF ALL 
ORGANIZATIONS
Improved digital security should be an aspiration for all civil 
society organizations, not just those at highest risk. While 
potential and current grantees will have different levels of 
risk, below are seven questions that you can ask of all 
organizations to help them improve their digital security. 
The questions below focus on specific pitfalls that are 
important at the time of writing. They are intended to get a 
conversation started, rather than cover all possible issues. 
For each, we highlight a potential solution. Asking these 
questions and listening closely to the answers of the 
grantee can give you a better sense of how strong their 
grasp is of their organization’s digital security, and deter-
mine whether to escalate any of your concerns to a trusted 
advisor on digital security issues.
We think asking these questions should be part of the 
standard process of grantcraft. Even organizations that are 
low risk for politically motivated digital attacks face other 
risks, including financial fraud or other data breaches. Such 
risks could be mitigated in part by following these steps (at 
the time of writing).
1. Question: How is your email hosted?
• Why is this important? Email is a key part of most 
organizations’ operations, yet it can be difficult or 
expensive to securely manage.
• Pitfall to look out for: Self-hosted servers, emails 
managed on a variety of different platforms, and the 
widespread use of personal email accounts.
• Potential solution: Managed email services for 
business. Managed solutions improve operational 
security by outsourcing security concerns to the 
provider instead of the organization. If organizations 
host or manage email themselves, be sure they have 
the internal technical capacity to do so effectively. 
Importantly, managed services may impact what 
jurisdiction the e-mail is held in, and are subject to 
privacy policies. You may wish to familiarize yourself 
with these issues.
2. Do you have a policy of “two factor” authentica-
tion on work accounts?
• Why is this important? Passwords are a basic 
security measure, but when used alone are vulnerable 
to phishing and hacking.
• Pitfall to look out for: Lack of additional login 
security, such as not using two factor authentication 
(e.g. an authenticator app, tokens, or SMS-based 
authentication). It may be useful to first ask about 
some of their most sensitive accounts (social media, 
email, financial services), though multi-factor authenti-
cation is important in general.
• Potential solution: Implementing two factor authen-
tication security for organizational accounts. Many 
service providers such as Google and Facebook offer 
two-factor authentication as an option waiting to be 
enabled. In an enterprise context, two factor is also 
available via some third party providers (e.g. Duo 
Security). A growing number of cases suggest that 
some governments intercept two-factor SMS 
messages, and we suggest you encourage grantees 
to use the authenticator apps available for phones 
(e.g. Google Authenticator). Grantees seeking a more 
robust level of security should use a physical two 
factor authentication “security key” such as a YubiKey.
3. Are your devices that store work information 
encrypted?
• Why is this important? Devices should be 
encrypted so that if devices are lost, stolen, or 
confiscated, confidential data is protected.
• Pitfall to look out for: Lack of “full disk” encryption 
on devices that handle work information or lack of 
awareness of the benefits of device encryption.
• Potential solution: A policy of full-disk encryption 
for work devices, including phones and computers, 
including on any personal devices where work-related 
information is stored.
4. Do you document digital security incidents?
• Why is this important? Mature organizations are 
likely to have experienced some form of digital 
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security incident during normal operations. Without 
good documentation, it can be difficult to quickly 
identify when an incident is occurring, even a large-
scale breach.
• Pitfall to look out for: Lack of policies and proce-
dures for documenting digital security threats. You 
can start by asking for post-incident reports from 
previous attacks or breaches. Other examples of 
problematic practices include discarding potentially 
malicious emails (rather than logging them and sharing 
with an IT specialist) or a failure to log alerts of 
suspicious activity.
• Potential solution: We suggest organizations work 
with an information security expert to establish a basic 
practice of documenting incidents as this information 
will be useful to a digital security expert an organiza-
tion might hire to address a security breach. Such 
documentation should include, for example, recording 
suspicious login attempts on accounts, saving 
suspicious emails, and documenting any loss of 
control of work devices.
5. Do you have a plan to respond to a crisis (e.g.  
Do you have a plan for what to do if your email is 
hacked)?
• Why is this important? Suffering a breach can  
be disruptive and costly, but the costs increase 
dramatically if there are no plans in place for mitigating 
the damage and if key information is not regularly 
backed up.
• Pitfall to look out for: Lack of a crisis response plan 
in case of a breach, lack of backups for data.
• Potential solution: Implementing an organiza-
tion-wide encrypted backup policy, and developing a 
basic response plan.
ENCRYPTED COMMUNICATIONS
The best way to secure your digital conversations is by using end-to-end encrypted commu-
nication tools, but they are not a panacea. 
A growing number of people and organizations are rightly concerned about the possibility that their sensitive internal conversa-
tions might be exposed to surveillance by state and non-state actors. As a result, many organizations undertake frustrating 
experiments with end-to-end encrypted e-mail. Email encryption is difficult to master and can be risky as it requires that all 
parties using it follow a strict protocol, otherwise the contents of a message can be exposed. 
As a stopgap, we suggest that organizations move their most sensitive internal and external communications to an end-to-end 
encrypted chat provider. At the time of writing, we recommend trying out Signal, a well-respected and carefully developed 
mobile and desktop encrypted chat provider that also supports voice calls. Signal also lets you set messages to auto-delete, 
protecting you if your device is confiscated or stolen.
Other more popular mobile apps, like WhatsApp also offer-end-to-end security, but may collect more metadata than Signal. 
Organizations may wish to balance the practice of using these more popular apps with the greater amount of metadata retained, 
and should do this in consultation with a digital security expert.
Encryption Does Not Mean Anonymity
End-to-end encryption does not make you anonymous, and metadata about who you are talking to and where you are located 
can still be collected with surveillance. However, it can be a dramatic improvement over unencrypted communications because 
what you write or speak cannot be eavesdropped on.
Beware —Encryption is Not a Panacea
For end-to-end encryption to be effective, it must be undertaken as part of a carefully calibrated plan, rather than on an ad-hoc 
basis. We are familiar with cases in which high risk groups placed an emphasis on encrypted chat and communications, but 
failed to secure their computers and devices. This resulted in breaches that included the contents of encrypted communications, 
siphoned directly from their devices, where they were not encrypted.
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6. Do you have a plan for improving your digital 
security?
• Why is this important? Digital security is a critical 
component of overall organizational security, and a 
digital security plan is necessary for improving good 
digital security practices.
• Pitfall to look out for: The organization lacks a plan 
for taking stock of or improving digital security.
• Potential solution: The organization should work 
with an expert to undertake an assessment of the 
digital security threats they face, as well as their digital 
security capacity gaps. A series of security policies 
(e.g. password management, administrative roles, 
travel policies, etc.) should be created based on the 
assessment and a realistic plan should be created to 
implement the policies (Step 3: React provides some 
suggestions about how to go about such a process).
• Note: Having received a digital security training or 
making use of digital security tools may be useful, but 
is never a panacea.
7. Does the organization use genuine (non-pirated), 
up-to-date software and operating systems on 
computers and mobile devices?
• Why is this important? Out-of-date software, or 
software that is not receiving regular updates are 
much more vulnerable to malware and other security 
issues. Pirated software often cannot be updated, and 
can also come pre-loaded with malicious software. 
This is not an academic concern. Recent attacks 
against Mexican and Emirati civil society used a 
vulnerability in iPhones that has since been patched 
with an update. Un-updated phones are still vulnerable.
• Pitfall to look out for: Organization is using pirated 
or un-updated software.
• Potential solution: Consider subsidizing the 
purchase of genuine software. In addition, many 
technology companies have free or low cost programs 
to provide software (including MS Windows) to 
registered non-profits.
Funders should help organizations develop and prioritize a 
culture of digital security. Asking the questions outlined 
above will help begin that process. There are, of course, 
many others. In the interest of time, we have not covered 
most issues in network security and administration. There 
are many important issues, but we think that if organiza-
tions successfully address the seven described above, they 
will have made a meaningful improvement.
Finally, we have created an annex with special guidance for 
digital security and international travel given that some 
funders support organizations that undertake regular 
international travel.
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SECTION 3
CONCLUSION – THINKING MORE SYSTEMATICALLY
T
his guide has sought to provide you with: 1) an 
overview of the evolving nature of targeted digital 
threats against civil society; 2) a three-step 
process for tentatively ranking the risk a grant 
poses from a digital security perspective; and 3) 
approaches for helping to improve the digital security 
posture of organizations, depending on the level of risk they 
face. While taking initial steps to help improve the digital 
security of all the organizations you work with is important, 
security is an evolving challenge and will need to be 
tracked through the lifetime of a grant, especially when you 
are working with high risk organizations. What follows are 
several best practices that we believe should be main-
streamed within grantcraft.
1. DO NOT START BY FUNDING PIECEMEAL DIGITAL 
SECURITY ACTIONS
An organization will become more resilient in the face of 
digital security threats if a systematic and evidence-based 
approach is taken from the beginning, instead of a patch-
work of general tactics. Funders should begin by devel-
oping a working assessment of the level of digital security 
risk an organization faces, then work with the grantee to 
systematically address the challenges that are identified. 
Importantly, this will likely require advice from outside 
experts, and may require some coordination among 
funders. Example outputs could include improving digital 
security policies and practices or making changes in an 
organization’s technological infrastructure.
2. COLLABORATE ON SHORT- AND LONG-TERM 
PLANNING WITH GRANTEES
Many civil society organizations will be outside of their 
expertise when engaging in digital security planning, and 
may find a conversation about this with a funder to be a 
challenge. Requesting that grantees write a brief self-as-
sessment of their own security challenges that accounts for 
mitigating both digital and physical threats is one way to 
TRAININGS: NOT A SILVER BULLET
Paying for a training is not the same thing as paying for a solution to a grantee’s security problem. While trainings may help to 
increase awareness within an organization of digital security issues, and may suggest steps to take, provided alone they are 
unlikely to result in systematic changes in the different behaviors, technologies, and habits necessary for security.
Some training providers make extensive efforts to tailor their curricula to each organization, the specific threats they face, and 
the resources they have to address them. However, many trainings are not designed to be so specific. This can create the 
problem that recommendations are mismatched with an organization’s culture and threats, and, in some cases, create 
conflicting information and messaging around security issues. Is can cause problems for IT staff working diligently with a 
slightly different approach to security, or promote faddish security tools, like a secure messaging app that is unlikely to be widely 
adopted. In the worst case, trainings can be sources of incorrect or confusing messages around security and can deepen the 
digital threats a given organization faces.
Threats against civil society organizations are serious and can sometimes be highly sophisticated. In some cases, the threat 
actors targeting civil society organizations are the same groups targeting governments or corporations. In the face of such 
threats, it would be considered irresponsible by a corporate board or a government oversight body to simply provide a short 
“digital security training” to employees, without investing in more systematic measures. There is a risk of developing a problem-
atic way of thinking about digital security for civil society that results in a separate and unequal approach that is overly weighted 
towards trainings, and neglects the insights from other sectors that face similar threats.
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help start a conversation. Importantly, high risk organiza-
tions will almost always need to develop short-term and 
long-term plans for their security and require assistance 
from an expert. While an outside expert may initially be 
important in helping organizations address their digital 
security gaps, the philosophy of grantmaking should focus 
on enabling organizations to continue to invest in their 
security so that they become more institutionally resilient in 
the digital age.
3. COLLABORATION BETWEEN FUNDERS
Lack of donor coordination on digital security threats facing 
civil society organizations can inadvertently escalate the 
problems grantees have instead of helping to resolve them. 
Therefore, whenever possible, donor collaboration is 
essential. We suggest you start by identifying other donors 
in your field who share similar concerns that you do about 
digital security and begin information sharing with them 
about any digital security concerns you have in relation to 
the field or with specific shared grantees. From there, you 
can develop coordinated approaches to advancing digital 
security at both the individual grantee- and field-level. Such 
an approach is likely to improve outcomes for your 
grantees, while also saving time and money.
4. ENCOURAGE ORGANIZATIONS TO MAKE 
ITERATIVE IT CAPACITY IMPROVEMENTS
IT capacity is rarely static; it is an evolving and iterative 
process. Below are some ideas for how grantmakers might 
encourage grantees to improve their IT capacity.
Hiring or sharing the time of a competent IT professional 
with information security expertise may be one of the single 
most important steps towards holistic security for an 
organization. This is particularly important for high risk 
organizations that might face targeted digital attacks. Lack 
of competent IT support has long-term costs in inefficien-
cies with how technology is used and what technology is 
selected by an organization. Concerningly, it often means 
that security issues go unaddressed.
Not all organizations will be able to hire an IT staff person 
with information security expertise. Yet there are still steps 
organizations can take short of that. Encouraging an 
organization to move towards cloud-based and managed 
services can reduce the administrative and security burden 
for specific services, such as document storage, 
web-hosting, and email.
In other cases, organizations may wish to collectively hire a 
trusted IT person or organization who can provide assis-
tance to multiple organizations. This may help address 
several issues at once, such as data sharing around 
threats, and ensuring that attacks targeting one organiza-
tion are noted, and other organizations in the same space 
provided with protection. As a funder, you may wish to 
identify such a trusted IT resource and draw on your 
network and contacts to vet the individual or organization. 
In other cases, you may wish to partner with other grant-
makers to identify and support shared IT capacity.
In addition, it is good practice to ensure that grantees have 
sufficient funds for equipment, including software licenses. 
It is a widespread practice that civil society organizations 
make use of pirated software and operating systems as a 
cost reducing measure. This opens them up to a range of 
serious threats that could be mitigated simply by paying for 
licenses.
CONCLUSION
Digital security threats are constantly evolving. We have 
attempted to calibrate the questions and process to the 
problem as we see it today (February, 2017). However, we 
anticipate that sources of risk and threats, as well as the 
basic technologies used within civil society, will continue to 
evolve. We welcome your feedback on this version of the 
document, as well as input for future versions. Please direct 
feedback to Eric Sears at the MacArthur Foundation 
(esears@macfound.org).
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ANNEX
SPECIAL NOTE ON INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL
International travel presents unique challenges for organizational and personal security. Staying connected is essential, but 
border crossings, hotels, and unfamiliar networks are all sources of risk. Any organization whose staff travel regularly 
should consider developing a travel security policy.
Both grantmakers and grantee organizations should consult with an expert to develop a travel policy tailored to their specific 
needs. Such a policy may include some of the following examples (this list is not exhaustive):
RISK POLICY
Private data seized at a border 
crossing
Travel with loaner laptops and devices that do not contain 
sensitive materials.
Device stolen Use full-disk encryption (see: Question 3 above) and always 
completely power down devices when you are not using them. 
Device infected with malware 
in hotel or meeting room
Do not leave devices unattended
There are many other specific security approaches that belong in a travel security policy, such as the use of Virtual Private 
Networks (VPNs). However, we strongly believe that these should be approached carefully, and staff trained to understand 
their protections and limitations.
